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The InsTITuTe For ConFlICT ManageMenT
Prakash Panneerselvam∗
The beginning of the 21st century has seen a crucial 
paradigm shift in the nature of conflict. Sub-conventional 
patterns, including intra-state conflict and international 
terrorism have replaced traditional inter-state armed conflict 
as the primary security challenge of nation states. 
While inter-state conflicts have declined in recent times, 
there has been a remarkable rise in intra-state and other sub-
conventional conflicts, which include sabotage, subversive 
confrontation and armed violence.1 Cyber space adds yet 
another dimension to both conventional and sub-conventional 
wars. 
This has led to the emergence of the concept of hybrid 
warfare, a phrase coined by former US Army Chief George 
W. Casey, who said future wars would entail “prevailing in 
protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other 
nations build capacity and assure friends and allies; support 
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1 Antony, A.K. “Keynote Address”, in Changing Nature of Conflict: Trends 
and Responses, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2009, p. 9.




civil authorities at home and abroad; [and] deter and defeat 
hybrid threats and hostile state actors.”2 Hybrid warfare 
involves threats to a nation’s political, military, economic, 
social, informational and infrastructural vulnerabilities. It 
usually involves non-state actors indulging in subversive roles 
supported by states in order to give the latter some plausible 
deniability. Hybrid warfare exploits the ambiguity of the 
fog of war to remain below obvious detection and response 
thresholds.3
The politico-economic fallout of such a war includes 
demographic and social tensions, leading to serious internal 
security and governance issues. With cities emerging as the 
nerve-centres of economic growth, it is crucial to enhance 
security of major Indian metropolis. In recent times, armed 
conflicts are increasingly taking place in urban spaces. The 
nation’s armed forces, principally oriented to counter external 
threats in open spaces, are ill-trained and equipped to fight in 
crowded urban areas with large civilian populations. But this 
is likely to change given the rising threat of hybrid conflict, 
which includes threats ranging from new forms of terrorism 
like ‘lone wolf’ attacks to cyber-terrorism and the use of armed 
force in urban settings is likely to increase. Security experts 
conceptualise anything disturbing urban settings violently as 
the ‘new terrorism’.
According to National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, although terrorist attacks 
took place in 100 countries in 2017, there was significant 
geographical concentration geographically. 59 per cent of all 
2 Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare, Joint Special 
Operations University, Tampa, 2013, p.4.
3 Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, MCDC Countering 
Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare, 2017, p. 4.
113
Is India ready to deal with Hybrid War?
attacks took place in five countries (Afghanistan, India, Iraq, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines), and 70 per cent of all deaths due 
to terrorist attacks took place in five countries (Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria).4   
Recent terrorist strikes targeting major cities across the 
world have added to the nightmares of policy makers, many 
already grappling with increasing violence in urban areas, 
including violent mobs rampaging through city streets, arson, 
assaults and assassinations, bombs and barricades, gang wars, 
killings and kidnappings.5  
Since it appears quite inevitable that the armed forces will 
be increasingly called upon to operate amidst areas with large 
civilian populations, the forces should understand the urban 
environment not merely against the backdrop of conflict, “but 
as a dynamic relationship with the force operating within it 
– local population, soldiers, guerrilla fighters, journalists, 
photographers and humanitarian agents.”6 Their overwhelming 
objective will be to disarm the potential threat without harming 
civilians or suffering unacceptable losses due to this restriction. 
Both civilian and soldier’s lives are equally compromised by the 
emerging threats around the cities and town in coming decades. 
This essay offers a three-pronged approach to understand the 
new threat and suggest ways to minimise civilian casualties 
during such hybrid conflicts in urban areas. 
4 “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to 
Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information”, Department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology, University of Maryland, Baltimore, 
2017, https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2017/.
5 Anthony Richards, “Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism,  Volume 37, Issue 3, 2014. 




Further, as Dexter Filkins notes, “Apart from the increased 
effectiveness and lethality of non-state actors within hybrid 
war, the symbiotic relationship between sponsor and client is 
another variable that differentiates hybrid war from traditional 
forms of conflict.”7 The Syrian Civil War and spread of Islamic 
State (IS)/Daesh presented examples of the complex strategic 
challenge to the world posed by modern hybrid warfare.    
Hybrid war that simultaneously combines conventional, 
irregular, and terrorist components is a complex challenge 
which can only be tackled by an adaptable and versatile 
military. As aptly stated by Carl von Clausewitz, “Every age 
has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own 
peculiar preconceptions.”8 The United States has increasingly 
focused on a counterinsurgency doctrine in the wake of its 
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
hYBRId WaRfaRe In uRBan envIRonMentS
Hybrid warfare in the urban-environment is seeing a 
revised form of combat techniques integrated into battle tactics 
to attack a strong enemy. Urban Warfare is generally defined 
as “Combat conducted in urban areas such as towns and 
cities.” But different nations define it differently. According to 
US Army’s “An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up 
Area” Military Operation in Urban Terrain (MOUT) is defined 
as: 
“all military actions that are planned and conducted 
on terrain where man-made construction affects the 
tactical options available to the commander. These 
7 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” New Yorker, September 23, 
2013, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-com 
mander.
8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976.
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operations are conducted to defeat an enemy that may 
be mixed in with civilians. Therefore, the rules of 
engagement (ROE) and use of combat power are more 
restrictive than in other conditions of combat.”9  
The Indian Army, part of many urban operations ranging 
from low-intensity conflict to counter-insurgency and 
guerrilla warfare, doesn’t have a formal doctrine per se for 
Urban Operations.  However, Professor C. Christine Fair of 
Georgetown University provides evidence to show that that 
India is adopting the US doctrine of MOUT to address this 
gap.10 Even though India is yet to develop a formal doctrine, 
it has acquired and developed competency equivalent to the 
MOUT doctrine. In formulating such a doctrine, the historical 
context and relevance plays a crucial role in developing and 
preparing soldiers for future urban-warfare. 
According to available literature, the concept of Urban-
Warfare started to evolve in the minds of military planners since 
the Second World War. The Battle of Stalingrad is a viable 
example to start with, in which the powerful German army 
was outlasted by the Soviet defenders. The Commander of the 
Soviet Army, Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, played a crucial role 
in that battle.  Realising the German Army’s inefficiency in 
Urban-Warfare, Chuikov developed an important tactic called 
“hugging the enemy”, by which he directed the Soviet Army to 
manoeuvre closely with German forces to avoid their superior 
artillery and airpower. He also employed effective psychological 
tactics, using snipers to terrorise German soldiers. The lack 
of popular support and underestimating resistance in the city 
prolonged the confrontation, and the German army lost the 
9 Department of Army, FM 90-10-1. “An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in 
Built-up Areas,1993, Washington D.C.
10 C. Christine Fair, “Military Operation in Urban Areas: The Indian 
Experience”, Indian Review, Volume 2, Number 1, 2003.
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Battle of Stalingrad because it employed conventional military 
tactics and underestimated the effectiveness of guerrilla tactics 
in an urban-environment. This was a major triumph for allied 
forces in the Battle of Stalingrad, and subsequently, the Battle 
for Berlin. From then on, military history has been dominated 
by urban military tactics.     
The Cold War environment again overturned the argument 
of conventional military superiority, deterring adversaries 
from direct attacks. Instead, war broke out in an asymmetric 
manner and was often fought in the vicinity of urban spaces. 
The Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam War (1995-1975), 
Lebanon (1982 and 2006), military operation in Beirut (1982-
1984) and the operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Syria, Philippines 
and Afghanistan are all principally sub-conventional warfare 
against the enemy, with a substantial proportion of operations 
concentrated in the urban terrain. In all these major conflicts, 
the US was greatly involved in fighting against adversaries in 
far-away cities. The US strategic community believes that this 
trend is likely to continue in future and that the military must 
be ready to conduct such operations.11   
Military planner and theorists have pointed out that “the 
beginning of the 21st century was marked by proliferation of 
hybrid wars between flexible and sophisticated adversaries 
engaged in asymmetric conflicts, using various forms of 
warfare according to the purpose and time chosen.”12 This 
new kind of war has not only questioned the traditional and 
conventional military thinking but, also generated lots of 
11 Daryl G. Press, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems and the Future”, MIT 
Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts, 2009, https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/92711/Urban_Warfare.pdf..
12 Russell W. Glenn, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems and Future”, MIT 
Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts, 2009, https://www.files.
ethz.ch/isn/92711/Urban_Warfare.pdf.
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debate in the strategic community over the definition of the 
“hybrid war” and also demands new appropriate measures to 
adapt to the new reality imposed by it.13
In the case of India, border disputes with its neighbours 
have dominated strategic affairs and policy thinking for the 
past 70 years. However, India also has reasonable experience 
in Urban-Combat. The insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir, 
the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) mission to Sri Lanka 
(1987-1990) and various counter-insurgency operations have 
enhanced Indian military might to face emerging challenges. 
Due to political sensitivities, the role of the Indian military is 
limited, and Indian Paramilitary Forces under the Ministry of 
Home Affairs take control of disturbed areas. But apart from 
the Indian Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, there is no 
official literature available in the public domain to understand 
the Indian armed forces’ policy towards sub-conventional and 
urban-warfare. 
Meanwhile, belligerent elements are increasingly and 
effectively exploiting the hybrid war paradigm in different 
shapes and forms. The rising number of terrorists, insurgents 
and guerrilla forces targeting India and its cities over the 
past 70 years poses a clear and present danger. The Britain 
Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) 
Countering Hybrid Warfare project has five major reasons for 
the rise of hybrid warfare.14
First, hybrid warfare uses a wider set of military, political, 
economic, civilian and informational instruments which are 
usually overlooked in traditional threat assessments. 
13 Ibid.
14 Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, “MCDC Countering 





Second, it targets vulnerabilities across societies in ways 
that we do not usually think about. 
Third, it synchronises attacks in novel ways. For example, 
by only looking at the different instruments of power an 
adversary possesses, one cannot necessarily predict how and 
to what degree they might be synchronised to create certain 
effects. Thus, the functional capabilities of a hybrid warfare 
adversary, although important, will not necessarily provide the 
right information to understand the problem. 
Fourth, hybrid warfare intentionally exploits ambiguity, 
creativity, and our understanding of war to make attacks less 
‘visible’. This is due to the fact that they can be tailored to stay 
below certain detection and response thresholds, including 
international legal thresholds, thus hampering the decision-
making process and making it harder to react to such attacks. 
Fifth, a hybrid warfare campaign may not be discovered 
until it is already well underway, with damaging effects having 
already begun manifesting themselves and degrading a target’s 
capability to defend itself.15 The September 11 attack on the 
US, followed by Indian Parliament attack on December 13, 
2001, the July 7, 2005, London subway bombing, the  infamous 
2008 attack on Mumbai and the series of ‘Lone Wolf’ attacks in 
Europe in the last few years targeting civilians clearly signify 
the change in tactics and urban settings emerging as a choice 
of target. In future, non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State/Daesh may seek urban spaces a viable option to 
launch attacks, particularly to seek media attention.  
With the improvement in technology and terrorist 
organisations simultaneously enabling small groups to inflict 
harm on much larger populations, “the weapon of terrorism 
15 Ibid.
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thus severely limited the safe harbour advantage enjoyed by 
the cities, in time of traditional warfare.”16 Therefore, from 
prolonged war to limited war and to the war on terror, cities 
are likely to be the new theatres of such conflicts. 
hYBRId taRget
In the new age of warfare, non-state actors are active in 
targeting cities and urban spaces to wage global campaigns. 
Urban spaces provide ample opportunity for terrorists and 
non-state actors to sneak in and inflict a brutal attack to 
terrorize large populations through “shock and awe” tactics. 
American terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins thus makes 
the following points: One, terrorism has become bloodier; 
two, terrorists have developed new financial resources so that 
they are less dependent on state sponsors; three, they have 
evolved new models of organisation and can now wage global 
campaigns; four, terrorists have effectively exploited new 
communications technologies; and five, some terrorists have 
moved beyond tactics to strategy, although none of them have 
achieved their stated long-term goals so far.17 
Violence is matter of perception and measurable 
phenomena. Certain categories of violence associated with 
political action, such as protests, strikes, demonstrations, tax 
revolts and civil disobedience movements are not classified 
as terrorist acts. Earlier, insurgents and guerrilla forces using 
similar terrorist tactics were exempted from the definition 
16 Edard L. Glaeser and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Cities and Warfare: The Impact 
of Terrorism on Urban Form”, Working Paper Number 8696, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
hier/2001papers/2001list.html.
17 Brain Michael Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism”, RAND Corporation, 




of terrorism. However, Alex P. Schimd of the International 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism, observed, 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated 
violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine 
individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to 
assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the 
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence 
are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) 
or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from 
a target population, and serve as message generators. 
Threat- and violence-based communication processes 
between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, 
and main targets are used to manipulate the main 
target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a 
target of demands, or a target of attention, depending 
on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is 
primarily sought.18
Schmid goes on to note that terrorism is the “peacetime 
equivalent of war crime.”19 This leaves no room for ambiguity 
in defining the terrorist act and clearly differentiates the 
relationship between terrorism and other violent acts in the 
society. 
Warfare has witnessed a constant change down the 
ages. Today, terrorist motivation relies on collateral damage 
and massive destruction. B.S Raghavan explains it in terms 
of “inhuman hatred, all-consuming ill-will and ranging 
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fanaticism”.20 The series of attack on cities worldwide makes 
it clear that non-state actors, insurgents and guerrilla forces are 
an emerging threat to urban areas.  
uRBan SettIngS 
Global urbanisation is a crucial environmental factor 
gaining prominence in urban warfare. Generally, an urban area 
is characterised based on the density of human population. In 
1800, less than 3 per cent of world population lived in urban 
areas. In the 21st century the figure has risen to approximately 
47 per cent, says the UN. By 2025 the world population living 
in urban areas is likely to grow significantly.21 Particularly, 
urbanisation in India is ratcheting up very fast. In 1991, only 
26 per cent of India’s population lived in urban areas. But 
projections conclude that, by 2025, 40 per cent of India’s 
population will be living in cities and two-third of the total 
population growth between 2000 to 2025 would be in urban 
areas.22 Mumbai, with 29,650 people per square kilometre, will 
be the second most populous city in the world by 2020, with 
over 25 million inhabitants. The future urban area is thus going 
to be increasingly congested, complex and confusing. At the 
same time, these cities emerge as centres of politics, finance, 
industry, transportation, communication and cultural activity. 
In the globalised world the city acts as a hub for business 
and international politics. Rapid urbanisation provides ample 
20 B.S. Raghavan, “Fight the war on New Terrorism to the finish”, Rediff, 
May 14, 2008,  https://www.rediff.com/news/2008/may/14guest1.htm, 
and Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban 
Warfighter of 2025”, Parameters, Summer, 1999, https://smallwarsjournal.
com/documents/urban2025.pdf.
21 Demographia World Urban Areas & Population Projections”, 2010, http://
www.demographia.com/db-worldua.pdf.




opportunity for business and trade to flourish, and transforms 
cities into economical nerve centres of a nation. Elena 
Irwin, Faculty Director at Ohio State Sustainability Institute, 
emphasises that “economic growth and urbanisation are 
inextricably linked.”23 Many rural areas have transformed into 
urban centres because of massive inflow of capital and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). Therefore, most nations have their 
economic strongholds in cities.    
The integrity of the nation is also based on its urban spaces 
due to their heterogeneity. Multi-cultural, multi-lingual and 
multi-religious societies are unique, but at times such diversity 
also creates a tension in urban society. German sociologist 
George Simmel asserts that urban living has a profound social 
and psychological effect. According to him, urban dwellers 
avoid emotional involvement and interactions tend to be 
economic, rather than social.24 The urban environment leads to 
a self-centred lifestyle and curtails socialising in larger ways. 
But though urban life is self-centred, many sociologists believe 
that distinctions and differences in class, caste and race still 
persist in the urban conglomerations. 
On a tactical level, high rise building, broad roads and lanes 
jostle for space with slums, narrow streets and congested lanes. 
Such irregularities are integral to urban areas, particularly in 
Third World countries, where urban spaces are not planned and 
governed properly. Therefore, they appear highly unorganised. 
On several occasions, when lives are in danger, street vendors, 
occupied pavements, traffic and haphazard and illegal parking 
have created major hurdles for emergency teams trying to 
reach crisis areas. 
23 E. Irwin, “Market forces and urban expansion”, 2014, https://wenku.baidu.
com/view/e300a1494b35eefdc9d33338.html.
24 Margaret L. Andersen and Howard F. Taylor, Sociology: Understanding a 
Diverse Society,Wadsworth Publishing, Belmont CA, 2007.
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Other major imperatives of emerging urban societies are 
knowledge and value based. The instant flow of information 
through modern telecommunications and social and mainstream 
media, allow inhabitants to communicate constantly in real 
time across vast distances, giving them a greater and immediate 
sense of awareness. Moreover, the mainstream media’s stress 
on immediate dissemination of news has often led to media 
crews reaching emergency spots before other first responders 
or law enforcement agencies. In future, the flow of information 
and media are increasingly going to determine the credibility 
of the government’s response to a crisis. There are also distinct 
possibilities that terrorist organizations, non-state actors and 
insurgents will exploit both modern communication tools and 
the media to achieve their political and ideological objectives. 
Strategically, cities play a critical role in the emerging 
security environment and offer a viable opportunity for non-
state actors, guerrillas, militants and terrorist to wage war 
against nations. For maximum impact, large gatherings, 
economic centres, diversity in society, as well as high profile 
monuments (symbols of nations), are often the targets of non-
state actors. If non-state actors manage to execute an attack 
in a highly urbanised space, they will inevitably succeed in 
promoting their objectives. Given this scenario, the armed 
forces’ response to such threats has to be swift and target 
oriented, while ensuring that no civilians are caught in the 
cross-fire.  
With this in mind, it is worth reflecting on Russia’s Chief 
of General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and his so-called 
“Gerasimov Doctrine,” which highlights the increasing 
importance of non-military means to achieve political and 
strategic goals, and the ramifications of these means. According 
to Gerasimov, the lessons of the Arab Spring are that if the 
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‘rules of war’ have changed, their consequences have not – the 
results of the ‘coloured revolutions’ are that a “thriving state 
can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into 
an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign 
intervention and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian 
catastrophe and civil war.” 25 In terms of the scale of casualties 
and destruction these new-type of conflicts are equivalent to 
the consequences of any real war. The Russian Armed forces 
therefore need to have a clear understanding of the forms and 
methods of the use and application of force. This corresponds 
to the statements by other senior Russian officials about how 
hybrid-type conflicts can evolve and merge—and draw states 
into interstate wars that then undermine them. Russian Armed 
forces need to be able to fight that “fierce armed conflict” and 
also shut out potential “foreign intervention.”26 
huManItaRIan ISSueS
Accomplishing military objectives inside populated 
areas is difficult. Besides, the rules of conduct devised by 
the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), largely limit state 
armed forces in their pursuit of targets in urban areas. IHL 
particularly focuses on the legality of the conduct of parties 
to hostility that has reached the level of armed conflict (jus in 
bello). 
25 Robert Coalson “Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for 







26 Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare”, Parameters, 
Volume 45, Number 4, Winter 2015-16.
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In an asymmetric conflict the weaker side can integrate or 
conceal itself within civilian populations to avoid detection. If 
the military target27 is within a civilian population, the objective 
tends to be immune from a wide range of attacks, per se. 28 At 
the same time, it is understood that a non-state actor benefits 
from the presence of civilian populations and uses it as a shield 
or cover in military operation, which is in total violation of 
international law.29 Article 57, Additional Protocol I, offers 
the following guidelines about the proportion of force to be 
used and precautions that armed force should take into account 
before attack30:  
•	 Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to 
be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and 
are not subject to special protection, but are military 
objectives; 
•	 Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
and methods of attack in order to avoid, or minimise, 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects; and 
•	 Refrain from deciding to launch any attack on a target 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
27 Under Article 52, military objectives are limited to “those objects which 
by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution 
to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage”.
28 Article 51, Geneva Convention.
29 Michael John-Hopkins, “Regulating the conduct of urban warfare: lessons 
from contemporary asymmetric armed conflicts”, International Review of 
the Red Cross, Volume 92, Number 878, 2010.
30 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities 
The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment”, Chatham House The Royal 





civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated. 
•	 Apart from these, Additional Protocol Articles 12, 15, 
53, 54, 55 and 56 impose liability on armed forces and 
restrain them from targeting civilian populations. 
The IHL also imposes a specific obligation on the armed 
forces to protect civilians and property in case of war, and the 
military commander is made responsible for the operation 
and is obliged to follow the key specific rules laid down by 
the IHL. Increasingly, non-government organisations, human 
rights watch groups and international law agencies have the 
authority to scrutinise the legality of military responses. 
In India, the government has arranged a specific mechanism 
to look into the violation of rules and norms of armed forces 
engaged in counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist activity. In 
principle, the Indian Constitution guarantees fundamental 
rights to citizens, and the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) is authorised to look into any violation of such rights. 
Nevertheless, the issue related to urban-combat is yet to be 
seriously analysed by the civil and/or legal administration. 
Civil society, human rights activist groups and media seek 
strong responses from the government to restrain the use of 
armed forces in urban areas. Indian authorities would need to 
closely study emerging trends in urban warfare if they are to 
craft appropriate responses.
IndIa and uRBan coMBat exPeRIence
India’s security perception over the past 70 years has been 
dominated by conventional military thinking. At the same time, 
India faces a unique internal security problem, partially aided 
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by external actors such as Pakistan’s ISI and China. Rapidly 
developing India faces crucial 21st century security challenges 
from all quarters.  
A report submitted to the Planning Commission under the 
heading “India Vision 2020” pointed out some key security 
issue for future India. There is no direct reference to urban 
environments, but it points out the key ‘Factors Influencing 
the Security Environment in 2020’31: 
•	 The twin revolution of rising expectations and 
information and communication will continue.
•	 The fundamental ideological conflict between India 
and Pakistan is unlikely to be resolved without a major 
socio-political change in Pakistan.
•	 Territorial disputes with neighbours that have defied 
resolution for 50 years may not lend themselves to an 
early solution.
•	 Religious extremism and radical politics will continue 
to have an adverse impact on core values.
•	 Rising dependence on energy imports will make us 
increasingly vulnerable, economically, as well as 
diplomatically.
•	 Public opinion, both domestic and international, and 
the media will become increasingly important forces 
in international affair.
•	 The international order is likely to evolve into a 
polycentric configuration, with its centre of gravity 
shifting increasingly to Asia, which will include seven 
out of the ten largest economies and six out of the eight 
nuclear weapon states.




•	 The increasing economic and military strength of 
China may pose a serious challenge to India’s security 
unless adequate measures are taken.
In the emerging security environment, the Indian armed 
forces will be increasingly responsible for countering internal 
security issues. Article 355 enjoins the Union to protect the 
States against “internal disturbance” and “armed rebellion”. It 
is from this Article that the central and state governments draw 
their authority to call upon the armed forces to provide aid to 
civil authority. 
The Indian Army formed a specialised force called “Para 
Commandos” to deal with special operations. Starting from 
the 1971 India-Pakistan War, the Para Commandos have 
participated in many operations in India and abroad: Operation 
Blue Star (1984), the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 
(1987), Operation Cactus in the Maldives (1988), the Kargil 
War (1999) and Operation Khukri in Sierra Leone (2000) are 
notable among these. 
Other specialised units formed for counter-terrorism and 
urban-warfare operations include the Ghatak Unit (Indian 
Army), Indian Navy’s Marine Commando (MARCOS) and 
Garuda Commando (Indian Air Force). Paramilitary special 
forces such as the National Security Guard (NSG), Special 
Protection Group (SPG), Special Frontier Group (SFG), 
Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) and the 
newly formed Force One elite commando force of the Mumbai 
Police are trained to respond to any urban terrorist attack within 
15 minutes.32  
32 Imran Gowhar, “City to get its own commando force”, Mid Day, October 
29, 2010, Mid Day: http://www.mid-day.com/news/2010/oct/291010-
similarly-commando-force-terror-training.htm.
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To facilitate the armed forces to carry out such operations, 
they are provided legal cover under the constitutional and legal 
statutes such as33: 
•	 Constitution of India, Articles 352 and 355.
•	 Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 127 to 131.
•	 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 and 1990.
•	 Regulation for the Army, 1987 Edition, Paragraphs 
301 to 307.
This legal cover imposes great responsibilities on the armed 
forces during such operations. However, civil right activists 
and human right groups have lodged a series of complaints 
against armed forces engaged in counter-insurgency and anti-
terrorist operations.  The best example to quote is Operation 
Blue Star, where the Army’s assault on the Golden Temple 
complex, the holiest Sikh shrine, resulted in a series of human 
rights’ violations.  Many top government officials, including 
K.P.S Gill, who served twice as Director General of Police 
(DGP) Punjab, criticised the pattern of the use of military 
force in operation Blue Star,  resulting in enormous human 
loss and material damage.34 This operation subsequently led 
to the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
and the subsequent anti-Sikh riots across the country. This case 
demonstrates the necessity of extreme caution while employing 
military force in the urban context. Even paramilitary forces 
employed in urban-centric warfare should be trained in all 
aspects of such operations, particularly including human rights 
issues and a high degree of political consciousness, apart from 
normal combat training.  
33 Rahul K Bhonsle, “Human Rights in Counter-terrorism Strategy”, CLAWS 
Journal, Winter, 2007.




PRePaRIng SoldIeRS foR the hYBRId WaRfaRe 
envIRonMent
Soldiers are essentially trained to kill or disable enemy 
forces during combat operations. But in urban warfare, they 
must temper that training to ensure the safety of civilians and 
also prevent unacceptable losses while doing so. To help them 
in this, smart robots, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and 
precision munitions offer a wide range of option for policy 
makers as well as tactical planners. At the same time, non-
state actors are also learning from past experience, presenting 
a more complex security challenge for the armed forces. The 
hybrid aspect of urban areas thus becomes a “centre of gravity” 
for non-state actors to wage a covert or direct assault on civilian 
populations to perpetuate their political or ideological struggle. 
 The responsibility of the soldier in this unique environment 
is thus enormous. The problem of identifying “foe or 
friend” remains the centrepiece of argument for civilian and 
combatant casualties. When differentiating enemy from friend 
is achievable, civilians and non-combatants will become less 
vulnerable during urban-conflict. Operational preparedness 
and a policy level approach for the armed forces, which 
might possibly reduce civilian, combatant and non-combatant 
causalities in urban-environments, is consequently necessary. 
tRaInIng ReQuIReMentS
The military is principally trained for conventional warfare. 
Fighting in built-up areas requires special battle techniques and 
tactics, as well as conditioning to overcome urban combat stress. 
Past performance guarantees nothing for future operations, and 
therefore, training sequences need to be revised constantly to 
match evolving situations. Soldiers must be prepared to absorb 
and understand complex situations before taking decisions in 
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dynamic built-up areas, rather than waiting for orders from 
higher authorities. Bottoms-up learning needs to be inculcated 
into the training methodology, and this should also fulfil the 
soldier’s career aspirations. This, in turn, encourages the urban 
war-fighter to assume responsibility and adopt correct attitudes 
while fighting an enemy in built-up areas. 
Reduce QuantuM of foRce
Armed forces operating inside built-up areas must use 
appropriate force to eliminate potential threats. Exercising 
massive fire-power against a weaker adversary results in 
excessive and avoidable collateral damage. Further, falling 
debris can provide fortifications for the enemy to mount 
attacks against the armed forces. In close quarter combat, the 
debris and destruction caused by shelling can jeopardise troop 
movements and make them vulnerable to enemy fire. Massive 
use of force in urban areas can result in destruction of lives and 
property. The use of air power, in particular, must be optimised, 
overwhelmingly for gathering intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, and transportation of personnel and material. 
Countries such as the US, Israel and Sri Lanka have effectively 
used air assets in operations against insurgents, which resulted 
in many civilian deaths. Moreover, the frequent use of the 
Predator UAVs to track and attack Taliban near the Af-Pak 
border resulted in numerous civilian casualties, and also 
strained the US-Pakistan relationship.  
Indian counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations 
principally take place internally. The inappropriate use of force 
not only kills fellow citizens, but also turns the public will 
against the government. Proportionate force is, consequently, 
necessary to tackle the menace. New weapon systems, with 
greater precision and lower levels of lethality, designed for 
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urban environments, need to be explored and deployed. 
Traditional tactics such as rolling in tanks, artillery, and 
conventional infantry in cities must be strictly prohibited and 
special command and control systems developed to monitor 
and direct soldiers in urban warfare to minimise the actual use 
of force in urban combat.      
doctRIne dRIven technologY
Rapidly evolving technology and sophisticated gadgets 
play a vital role in reducing civilian and combatant casualties 
in urban area. Basically, superior technology gives the armed 
forces an   edge while dealing with enemy forces. In hybrid 
warfare, strategic thinkers believe technology has to be 
modified according to need of an operator (soldier). Advances 
in limited effect ammunition can help planners and operators 
reduce collateral damage by inflicting a carefully measured 
quantum of destruction. 
Non-lethal technology will also be helpful for the armed 
forces engaging in urban-combat other than war. For instance, 
in peacekeeping operations or a humanitarian situation, non-
lethal weapons can help the armed force perform their duty 
without inflicting major casualties. However, operators should 
not over-use such weapons. Moreover, any indiscriminate or 
excessive use can also prove counter-productive. For example, 
the overuse of “pellet guns” in Kashmir has led to a huge 
uproar and public anger against the armed forces in the Valley. 
StReSS In hYBRId-coMBat
Combat in open space gives much room for soldiers to 
engage a target. But operations in built-up areas with complex 
building structures restrict a soldier’s view, creating tension 
and panic. Stress is compounded by the pressure to engage 
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targets while minimising civilian casualties.  This stress creates 
negative reaction and can result in misconduct. In long-drawn 
deployments, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) and 
Combat Stress Disorder (CSD) undermine a soldier’s combat 
effectiveness. Soldiers deployed in extreme condition are prone 
to CSD. For instance, as many as 891 suicide cases have been 
reported by the Indian defence forces between 2011 and 2018.35 
In many cases, stress has led the killing of fellow officers or 
soldiers, as well as civilians in combat areas. 
Stress disorders can be partially addressed by tough and 
realistic training, making soldiers understand the operational 
environment and keeping them informed about enemy tactics 
and movements. A habit of following Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) and the army’s moral code must also be inculcated. 
Scientific debriefing after operations help soldiers understand 
the environment and keep them healthy.   
Real tIMe SItuatIonal aWaReneSS
Real Time Situational Awareness (RTSA) is going to 
be important component for future soldiers. The flow of 
intelligence has to be channelised properly to reach every 
operator in the battle field and alert them about the situation 
around them in real time. Enclosed urban spaces limit a 
soldier’s ability to look beyond a certain range; so intelligence 
gathered through various other sources invariably helps them 
engage the correct target. 
RTSA, human intelligence and intelligence through other 
(technological) means can be major sources to help distinguish 
“foe from the friend” in the urban battlefield.  It also helps the 
35 “Between 2011 and 2018, Almost 900 Armed Forces Personnel Died by 




soldier in a vulnerable or disadvantaged position in a built-up 
area find the right direction for pursuit or engagement. 
PeRcePtIon ManageMent
The military or any other armed force in today’s context has 
to be prepared to face public scrutiny. Perception management 
thus becomes an imperative to protect the image of armed 
forces in battle and gain or retain public support.  Social media 
platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram and 
others play an important role in the modern world. Terrorists 
around the globe have been using these platforms to recruit 
members for their organisations, collect donations and spread 
fake news to create panic in the society. The Islamic State/ 
Daesh is the best example, as it effectively used social media 
to spread their ideology around the globe. They have also used 
these media tools to recruit members for their organisation in 
Syria and Iraq to fight against government forces. The armed 
forces, consequently, have a huge additional responsibility   to 
use social media to counter these narratives. 
Soldiers are the centrepiece of any armed force. Fighting 
in built-up areas is a relatively new discourse in the Indian 
armed forces. Since India is surrounded by unstable and 
hostile countries, the armed forces have to prepare for every 
eventuality. Other than war, the army’s preparation for Stability 
and Support Operation (SASO) is necessitated by India’s 
power projection in Asia. The increase in population and the 
growing pace of India’s economy will open new urban centres 
across the nation. Since urban areas are the country’s nerve 
centres, the government will need to respond accordingly, to 
set up specialised security arrangements across all cities to deal 
with all possible threats spawned by hybrid warfare. 
